Funding Under Constraint
Dynamics, Inequalities, and Resilience of LGBTQI+ Movements in Francophone North Africa

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Tiwiza
التويزة

The term “Tiwiza” is an Amazigh word that refers to the collective effort of a community to support one another through mutual aid and solidarity. In this report, Tiwiza refers to a regional North African project established in 2024 dedicated to strengthening the resilience of LGBTQI+ movements and individuals in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Since its creation, Tiwiza has become a “family.” In other words, a space of safety, recognition, and belonging, built through the contributions of several local organizations working to advance sexual and gender diversity across the region.
www.tiwiza.org

EGIDES

Égides, the International Francophone Alliance for Equality and Diversities, is an international charity dedicated to strengthening the visibility, inclusion, and rights of LGBTQI communities across the French-speaking world. Égides and its members work to facilitate the international meeting and mobilization of French-speaking LGBTQI organizations and leaders, to ensure their access to French-language resources, to strengthen their capacities and actions, and to promote the availability of funding that is accessible and adapted to the issues, needs and priorities of LGBTQI communities.
www.egides.org

The views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Égides or its partners.

GLOBAL
PHILANTHROPY
PROJECT

Global Philanthropy Project (GPP) is a collaboration of funders and philanthropic advisors working to expand global philanthropic support to advance the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people in the Global South and East.

https://globalphilanthropyproject.org/

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

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

This report analyses the funding dynamics of LGBTQI+ movements in Francophone North Africa, with a focus on Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. It is situated within a context of global contraction in human rights funding, accelerated shrinking of civic space, and the rise of anti-rights offensives that disproportionately affect feminist and LGBTQI+ organisations in the Global South. The analysis draws on semi-structured interviews conducted in 2025, complemented by data from the Global Philanthropy Project (GPP)[1], an in-depth review of donor and human rights organisation reports, and a legal and political analysis of national contexts.

At the global level, funding specifically dedicated to LGBTQI+ people and organisations represents less than 0.4% of international philanthropy, approximately 39 cents for every 100 dollars (USD) distributed. This structural scarcity is now compounded by major budgetary decisions taken by several longstanding bilateral donors. In the United States, the restructuring of USAID led to the cancellation of approximately 86% of programmes, representing nearly 76 billion USD, directly affecting mechanisms supporting civil society and sexual and reproductive rights. In the Netherlands, more than 70% of funding for international civil society strengthening has been eliminated. At the same time, Sweden announced a reduction of 3 billion SEK in its official development assistance for the period 2026-2028. These decisions have immediate repercussions for regranting mechanisms and Global South organisations.

GPP data show that Francophone territories receive only around 1% of global LGBTQI+ funding, reflecting a marginalisation that is simultaneously geographical, linguistic, historical, and political. In the MENA region[2], LGBTQI+ funding grew from approximately 6.9 million USD in 2013-2014 to 15.3 million USD in 2021-2022, but this progression conceals significant internal inequalities. The Maghreb[3] received only approximately 4.66 million USD cumulatively over the period 2013-2022, representing nearly 10% of the MENA total, with marked volatility. In 2021-2022, while MENA funding increased by 67%, the Maghreb's share fell to 8.2%, illustrating a persistent marginalisation.

1. Global Philathropy Project, https://globalphilanthropyproject.org/

2. MENA: acronym for Middle East and North Africa. A term designating a group of countries in North Africa and Western Asia, including the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and Iran.

3. Referring to the western region of North Africa, generally comprising Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

At the national level, GPP data for the period 2013-2022 reveal an unequal distribution of LGBTQI+ funding across the Maghreb. Tunisia concentrates the largest share, with 3,002,146 USD, 6.5% of the MENA total, distributed across 113 grants, at an average of 26,568 USD per grant. Morocco received 1,230,215 USD over the same period, representing 2.7% of the MENA total, through 65 grants averaging 18,926 USD each. Algeria remains significantly behind, with 430,126 USD cumulatively, 0.9% of the MENA total, distributed through 22 grants averaging 19,551 USD. In total, the Maghreb received 4,662,487 USD between 2013 and 2022, representing approximately 10.1% of LGBTQI+ funding allocated to the MENA region.

The report demonstrates that access to funding depends less on the level of risk or community needs than on organisations' capacity to meet demanding administrative, linguistic, and institutional requirements. The administrative burden functions as an indirect selection mechanism, favouring more professionalised organisations while marginalising informal, trans-led, young, or linguistically minoritised collectives. Gatekeeping practices reinforce these dynamics, the centralisation of information, and the concentration of donor relationships within a limited number of intermediary actors.

The analysis also highlights the growing impact of geopolitical dynamics on access to funding. With reference to the conclusions of several international bodies establishing that a genocide[4] is taking place in Gaza[5], feminist and LGBTQI+ organisations in the region have had grants suspended or cut due to their public positions, revealing the emergence of implicit political conditionalities, particularly among certain European and North American donors. This trend is documented both through interviews and by recent analyses from human rights organisations.

4. OHCHR press release (16 Sept. 2025), Israel has committed genocide in the Gaza Strip, UN Commission finds, confirming that the Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded that Israel committed genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, based on the 1948 Genocide Convention. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/israel-has-committed-genocide-gaza-strip-un-commission-finds

5. UN Special Rapporteur (20 Oct. 2025), Gaza Genocide: a collective crime, report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, characterising the genocide in Gaza as a collective crime and analysing the complicity of third states in its perpetration and continuation. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/special-rapporteur-report-gaza-genocide-a-collective-crime-20oct25/

In response to these constraints, LGBTQI+ organisations in North Africa are developing strategies of financial and organisational resilience adapted to legally hostile contexts. In Algeria, survival depends on informal, highly secured, and fragmented forms of organisation. In Tunisia, collectives adopt hybrid configurations to manage administrative and political risks. In Morocco, organisations develop financial and organisational architectures suited to a legally hostile environment, grounded in solidarity, interpersonal trust, and structuring forms that do not require explicit LGBTQI+ registration. These practices are not the product of opportunistic evasion, but constitute political and pragmatic responses to the absence of appropriate legal and banking frameworks.

The report further underlines the central role of feminist and queer funds, which remain the primary supporters of LGBTQI+ movements in Francophone North Africa. Their administrative flexibility, attention to linguistic dimensions, and capacity to operate in high-risk contexts stand in stark contrast to dominant institutional models. However, these funds remain undercapitalised and heavily exposed to the global contraction of resources.

In conclusion, this report underscores the necessity of strengthening multi-year, flexible, multilingual, and contextualised funding models, grounded in a nuanced understanding of local political and security realities. Without a structural transformation of funding practices, administrative, linguistic, and geopolitical hierarchies will continue to produce the invisibilisation and precarisation of LGBTQI+ movements in Francophone North Africa.



II Methodology

Methodology

This report is based on a qualitative and analytical methodology combining semi-structured interviews, secondary data analysis, and a targeted documentary review. It aims to analyse the funding dynamics of LGBTQI+ movements in Francophone North Africa, with a focus on Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

The analysis draws on fourteen semi-structured interviews conducted in 2025 with key actors in the LGBTQI+ funding ecosystem, including international and regional donors, feminist and queer funds, intermediary regranting organisations, as well as formal and informal local LGBTQI+ organisations and collectives. For security reasons, all interviews were conducted anonymously via secure platforms, primarily Jitsi and Signal. The interviews were conducted directly by the researcher, without intermediaries or translation. Interviews were carried out in Darija, French, and English, according to each interviewee's working language. They covered modalities of access to funding, administrative and linguistic requirements, security constraints, the effects of recent geopolitical dynamics, and the circumvention and resilience strategies developed by local organisations.

This qualitative analysis is complemented by GPP data, enabling a comparative reading of the volumes and geographical distribution of LGBTQI+ funding. The report also draws on a documentary review of institutional and advocacy reports, as well as a legal and political analysis of national frameworks governing freedom of association, foreign funding, and the criminalisation of LGBTQI+ people in the countries studied. The overall analysis adopts a feminist, intersectional, and decolonial approach, attentive to the power relations that structure access to resources, the production of legitimacy, and the visibility of LGBTQI+ movements in constrained political and security contexts.

1. Methodological Limitations

The findings of this report should be read as a situated analysis of a funding ecosystem characterised by structural opacity, fragmented flows, and high security constraints. The anonymisation of interviews and use of secure platforms, indispensable for protecting individuals and organisations, limit the precise attribution of certain practices to specific mechanisms and reduce the possibility of public triangulation. Furthermore, a significant proportion of funding in the region passes through informal, indirect, or undocumented channels that partially evade available databases, including those of the GPP. The analysis, therefore, prioritises the identification of structural dynamics, administrative, linguistic, geopolitical, and relational, and their effects on movements, rather than a total quantification of flows.

III. Global and Francophone Trends in LGBTQI+ Funding

Global and Francophone Trends in LGBTQI+ Funding

1. Global Context of LGBTQI+ Funding

At the global level, funding dedicated to the rights and well-being of LGBTQI+ people is going through an unprecedented phase of contraction. After a period of gradual consolidation throughout the 2010s, driven by increased commitments from bilateral donors and private foundations, **the current trend is marked by a reduction of available resources, heightened instability, and weakened structural support mechanisms.** This shift is explained by both national budgetary choices and by the growing offensive of anti-rights coalitions contesting the very legitimacy of such funding.

This contraction is also reflected in the dynamics observed among intermediary organisations. The latest GPP report, *Shocks & Shifts: Impact of major donor funding cuts on LGBTI intermediary infrastructure* (2025)[6], documents an average 25% reduction in LGBTQI+ regranting budgets since 2024, with even steeper declines among leading intermediaries operating in Global South and East countries. In MENA, three of the five main intermediary donors, representing 41% of grants allocated in the region in 2021-2022, reported a reduction in their regional budgets. The report further highlights the alarming weakening of emergency funding mechanisms, notably following the termination of the Dignity for All programme, directly undermining those exposed to heightened security risks.

These developments reflect not only a quantitative decline in resources but a qualitative transformation of the support infrastructure, with a particularly severe impact on security and rapid-response mechanisms.

6. Global Philanthropy Project (GPP), Shocks & Shifts: Impact of major donor funding cuts on LGBTI intermediary infrastructure (2025), https://globalphilanthropyproject.org/2025/11/26/shocks-shifts-summary-report/

United States : The dissolution of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2025 marks a major turning point. The integration of the agency into the State Department resulted in the cancellation of nearly 86% of programmes, representing approximately 76 billion USD[7]. Cuts fell primarily on civil society, democratic governance, the rule of law, reproductive health, and basic education, with reductions ranging from 85 to 100%[8]. Bilateral funding for Morocco (32 million USD) and Tunisia (51 million USD) was eliminated[9]. This withdrawal jeopardises structural mechanisms such as the Global Equality Fund, which had mobilised more than 100 million USD since 2011 to support LGBTQI+ organisations in more than 100 countries[10]. The immediate effects include the suspension of hundreds of sub-grants, the closure of essential programmes (HIV health, mental health, legal aid, documentation of violations), and mass redundancies across dozens of organisations worldwide[11].

Netherlands : In November 2024, the Dutch government announced a reduction of more than 70% in the budget line for international civil society strengthening, from 1.4 billion to 400 million euros[12]. Specific lines dedicated to women's rights and gender equality were eliminated[13]. This decision ends a historic role of progressive leadership that had enabled multi-year funding of feminist and LGBTQI+ movements through flagship programmes such as *Power of Pride and Leading from the South*. The direct consequences for Global South organisations include the disappearance of core funding, the collapse of redistribution channels through Dutch NGOs (Rutgers, COC Nederland, HIVOS, CHOICE), and the increased marginalisation of already deprioritised regions such as North Africa[14].

7. DonorTracker, US Government cuts USAID staff and funding, 2025.
https://donortracker.org/policy_updates?policy=us-government-cuts-usaid-staff-to-15-positions-releases-additional-details-on-funding-cuts
8. Center for Global Development, USAID Cuts: New Estimates at Country Level, 2024. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/usaid-cuts-new-estimates-country-level
9. Ibid
10. OutRight International, Defunding Freedom: Impacts of US Foreign Aid Cuts on LGBTIQ+ People Worldwide 2.0, 2025. Available at:
https://outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/Defunding%20Freedom_Impacts_US_Foreign_Aid_Cuts_on_LGBTIQ_People_Worldwide_2.pdf
11. Ibid.
12. Government of the Netherlands, First development budget cuts announced: overhaul of grants for NGOs, 2024.
https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2024/11/11/first-development-budget-cuts-announced-overhaul-of-grants-for-ngos
13. Rutgers International, Netherlands risks setback in women's rights and equality due to budget cuts, 2025.
https://rutgers.international/news/netherlands-risks-setback-in-womens-rights-and-equality-due-to-budget-cuts/
14. Rutgers International, Sexual health and rights of women, girls, and LGBTQI+ people worldwide endangered by Dutch government budget cuts, 2024.
https://rutgers.international/news/sexual-health-and-rights-of-women-girls-and-lgbtqi-people-worldwide-endangered-by-dutch-government-budget-cuts/

Sweden : In September 2024, Stockholm announced a reduction of 3 billion SEK (approximately 294 million USD during that period) in its annual official development assistance (ODA) for the period 2026-2028[15]. While Sweden maintains its commitment to multilateralism and the rule of law, the sectoral analysis reveals a significant retreat from gender equality as a priority. The share of bilateral ODA dedicated to gender equality as a principal objective fell from 18% in 2021 to 10% in 2024, its lowest level since 2010[16]. In absolute terms, this represents a contraction of 5 billion SEK in programmes with gender equality as an objective, including 2 billion SEK in exclusively dedicated funding. This trend narrows the space for autonomous projects led by feminist and LGBTQI+ organisations, in favour of mainstreaming approaches in which the visibility and monitoring of these issues become uncertain[17].

The combination of these decisions produces three major effects:

1. The gradual disappearance of core and long-term funding in favour of short, hyper-thematic projects, poorly adapted to the needs of institutional consolidation and activist security.

2. The de-prioritisation of sexual and reproductive rights, gender equality, and LGBTQI+ inclusion within budgetary frameworks poses a risk of invisibilisation in statistical tracking and effective fund allocation.

3. The weakening of multilateral funding mechanisms has been undermined by US cuts to United Nations agencies and budgetary pressures within the international system.

These global dynamics reflect a concerning retreat from international commitments to human rights, particularlyLGBTQI+ rights.
They contribute to reinforcing the vulnerability of movements in the most exposed regions, such as North Africa, where accessible resources were already structurally limited.

15. DonorTracker, Sweden slashes ODA budget amid domestic priorities, 2024.
https://donortracker.org/policy_updates?policy=sweden-slashes-oda-budget-amid-domestic-priorities-2024
16. Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, Sweden's Development Assistance for Gender Equality, 2025.
https://kvinnatillkvinna.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/The-Kvinna-till-Kvinna-Foundation-Swedens-development-assistance-for-gender-equality.pdf
17. OECD, Development Co-operation Profiles: Sweden, 2025.
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/development-co-operation-profiles_04b376d7-en/sweden_557d7c2d-en.html

Canada : Canada remains a central public actor in LGBTQI+ rights funding, both internationally and domestically, through a combination of structural programmes and more flexible mechanisms. In North Africa, this commitment is reflected notably in the Tiwiza project, led by Égides and funded by Global Affairs Canada, for up to 1.44 million CAD (approximately 1.06 million USD) over the period 2024-2026. This programme explicitly targets strengthening LGBTQI+ movement resilience in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia through direct support for local initiatives, attention to the mental health and security of activists, and the reinforcement of regional and international advocacy networks[18].

In parallel, the Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) constitutes a complementary, more decentralised channel operating at a smaller scale, mobilising annual envelopes for local projects that integrate, among other priorities, the inclusion of 2SLGBTQI+ people. For the period 2024-2025, the CFLI mobilised 400,000 CAD for Morocco (Rabat)[19], 270,000 CAD for Tunisia[20], and 250,000 CAD for Algeria [21], within multisectoral projects aligned with Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy. While these funds are not exclusively dedicated to LGBTQI+ issues, they explicitly integrate dimensions of inclusion, diversity, human rights, and inclusive governance, offering indirect but strategic opportunities for local organisations operating in heavily constrained contexts.

18. Government of Canada, Projet Égides, Renforcement des mouvements LGBTQI+ en Afrique du Nord, Global Affairs Canada (CA-3-P013736001): https://w05.international.gc.ca/projectbrowser-banqueprojets/project-projet/details/P013736001
19. Government of Canada, Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), Rabat, Morocco (CA-3-P014221060): https://w05.international.gc.ca/projectbrowser-banqueprojets/project-projet/details/p014221060
20. Government of Canada, Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), Tunis, Tunisia (CA-3-P014221069): https://w05.international.gc.ca/projectbrowser-banqueprojets/project-projet/details/p014221069
21. Government of Canada, Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), Algiers, Algeria (CA-3-P014221006): https://w05.international.gc.ca/projectbrowser-banqueprojets/project-projet/details/p014221006

2. GPP Data: Global and Francophone

Data produced by the GPP through the *Global Resources Report* (GRR) constitute the most comprehensive source for understanding the reality of LGBTQI+ funding at the international level. The latest cycle (2021-2022) indicates more than 8,000 grant recipients, a 35% increase compared with previous periods, reflecting a broadening of the beneficiary base[22]. However, this quantitative growth should not obscure the structural weakness of available funding. **LGBTQI+-specific grants remain marginal within philanthropy as a whole, representing less than 0.4% of foundation funding.** This estimate is based on a comparison with the total volume of grants from US foundations documented in the Giving USA Annual Report on Philanthropy, given the absence of comparable consolidated global data. In other words, for every 100 dollars distributed by foundations, fewer than 39 cents are directed towards LGBTQI+ initiatives. This figure represents an upper estimate and would likely be even lower if all global philanthropic funding could be included in the comparison[23].

Moreover, **the geographical distribution of this funding remains highly unequal.** According to the *Global Resources Report 2021-2022*, 57% of global LGBTQI+ funding is concentrated in North America, while Western Europe captures 4%, meaning that approximately 61% of resources are allocated to these two regions[24]. Conversely, **only 32% of funding is directed towards Global South and East countries. These regions nonetheless are home to nearly 90% of the world's population and concentrate a large share of contexts characterised by criminalisation and vulnerability.** This marginalisation is compounded by recent dynamics of budgetary contraction, in particular the massive cuts in the United States and the Netherlands, which have further reduced the funding channels accessible to organisations in already under-resourced regions.

Within this global context of scarcity, **the situation of Francophone territories is particularly alarming.** The joint Égides-GPP report (2023) reveals that only 1% of global LGBTQI+ funding is allocated to Francophone contexts[25]. This extremely low figure reflects a double marginalisation: on the one hand, the structural exclusion of Global South regions from the main funding circuits; on the other, the limited recognition by international donors of the linguistic and contextual specificities of the Francophone world.

22. Global Philanthropy Project, *Global Resources Report: Government and Philanthropic Support for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex Communities*, 2021-2022. Available at: http://globalphilanthropyproject.org/grr2021-22

23. Global Philanthropy Project, *Global Resources Report: Government and Philanthropic Support for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex Communities*, 2021-2022. Available at: http://globalphilanthropyproject.org/grr2021-22

24. Ibid

25. Égides & Global Philanthropy Project, *Global LGBTQI+ Resources Report in the Francophone World*, 2023. Available at: https://globalphilanthropyproject.org/2023/05/16/francophone-perspective/

Language barriers, administrative complexity of funding mechanisms, and insufficient knowledge of the dynamics specific to Francophone LGBTQI+ movements all contribute to this invisibilisation.

In many cases, Francophone organisations struggle to access international funds directly and must depend on Anglophone intermediaries, which reduces their autonomy and capacity for action.

The actors involved in Francophone funding remain limited in number. Certain international private foundations, such as Open Society Foundations and the Arcus Foundation, have provided occasional support, often through global programmes that do not necessarily incorporate an adapted linguistic or regional perspective. European governments such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Canada have also played a structuring role, but their contributions are now experiencing a sharp decline. Finally, regional feminist funds, such as the Mediterranean Women's Fund (FFMed), The Doria Feminist Fund and the Leading from the South programme, act as essential relays, redistributing limited resources towards local organisations that are often invisible to major donors. However, with the exception of Égides, mechanisms specifically designed to address the needs of Francophone LGBTQI+ movements remain rare. A recent development worth noting is the Francophone Feminist Alliance (Alliance féministe francophone), announced at the 2024 Francophonie Summit in October 2024. Coordinated by Equipop, the Fund for Women in the Mediterranean (FFMed) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), with a total budget of €5 million from the Agence Française de Développement, this initiative represents a meaningful step toward addressing the structural underfunding of Francophone feminist organisations and strengthening their participation in multilateral spaces[26].

The analysis of GPP data thus highlights a troubling paradox: while Francophone LGBTQI+ movements face particularly hostile legal and social contexts, their access to financial resources remains largely insufficient. This double marginalisation, geographical and linguistic, undermines not only organisational capacities but also the very continuity of community networks, compromising their central role in the defence of human rights.

26. Equipop, Press Release: Creation of the Francophone Feminist Alliance, 7 October 2024. https://equipop.org/en/cp-alliance-feministe-francophone/

3. GPP Data: MENA and the Maghreb

Data from the GPP's *Global Resources Report*, shared directly by GPP, allow us to observe a contrasted evolution of LGBTQI+ funding in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region between 2013 and 2022.



Over the decade, funding broadly increased, rising from 6.9 million USD in 2013-2014 to more than 15.3 million USD in 2021-2022. This progression reflects a degree of consolidation of flows towards the region. However, this volume remains low compared with other regions of the Global South, and is particularly fragile in the face of recent international budget cuts.

The evolution of LGBTQI+ funding in the MENA region shows an overall increase in amounts, but the specific share allocated to the Maghreb remains modest. Between 2013 and 2020, funding destined for the Maghreb experienced sustained growth, peaking at more than 1.6 million USD in 2019-2020, approximately 18% of the MENA total. However, the trend reversed during the 2021-2022 cycle: even as total MENA funding surged to 15.35 million USD (a 67% increase compared with 2019-2020), allocations to the Maghreb fell back to 1.26 million USD, reducing its relative share to 8.2%.

This divergence highlights a paradox: the overall increase in resources for the region does not proportionally benefit the Maghreb, where funding appears particularly volatile and sensitive to the shifting priorities of donors. Periods of strong growth (notably 2017-2018 and 2019-2020) appear linked to punctual bilateral or thematic programmes, whose interruption results in an immediate drop in funding.

This volatility reflects the structural dependence of Maghreb organisations on a limited number of funding windows, primarily European and multilateral, without genuine continuity or sustainable financing mechanisms. It also reflects the fact that, despite growing visibility in certain international circles, LGBTQI+ organisations in the Maghreb remain peripheral in the overall allocation of resources within the MENA region.

The Maghreb's share : The Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) represents a small share of this funding, with marked fluctuations over time. In 2013-2014, the sub-region captured only 1.8% of the MENA total. Its share then grew significantly, reaching 17.8% in 2019-2020, before falling sharply to 8.2% in 2021-2022. This decline is particularly concerning, as it occurs in a context where the needs of local organisations have increased. In absolute terms, the Maghreb received 4.66 million USD over the period 2013-2022, approximately 10% of the MENA regional total.

Relative share of the Maghreb and Countries in Total LGBTQI+ Funding for the Mena Region (%)



In 2013-2014, the Maghreb represented less than 2% of total LGBTQI+ funding directed at MENA. Its share then grew rapidly, reaching nearly 18% in 2019-2020. However, this dynamic reversed sharply during the 2021-2022 cycle: even as MENA funding increased strongly, the Maghreb's share fell to only 8.2%.

At the national level, Tunisia clearly dominates the sub-region, reaching more than 11% of total MENA funding in 2019-2020, but falling back to 4.6% in 2021-2022[27]. Morocco experienced a gradual improvement, rising from 0.3% in 2013-2014 to nearly 3.6% in 2021-2022. Algeria, meanwhile, remains marginalised: after representing 2.3% in 2017-2018, its share fell to only 0.1% in the most recent cycle.

These data highlight the Maghreb's dual vulnerability: on the one hand, the sub-region depends on a handful of thematic programmes that can dramatically amplify or reduce its share from one cycle to the next; on the other, its relative position within regional funding remains structurally marginal, exposing its organisations to continual precarity.



27. GRR data are recorded according to the year of grant award rather than annual disbursement. Some fluctuations may therefore reflect the awarding of significant multi-year grants concentrated in a given cycle, rather than an immediate structural change in financial flows.

In cumulative terms over the period 2013-2022, Tunisia captures approximately 3 million USD (6.5% of the MENA total), Morocco 1.23 million USD (2.7% of the MENA total), and Algeria only 430,000 USD (0.9% of the MENA total). These disparities reveal a persistent hierarchy in which Tunisia concentrates the majority of flows to the Maghreb, while Algeria remains structurally marginalised.

This hierarchy, however, must be analysed in light of recent political dynamics. In Tunisia, civic space has undergone a troubling contraction since 2021, marked by increasing restrictions on civil society, threats of association dissolution, and growing stigmatisation of human rights defenders. This context directly undermines organisations' capacity to absorb and manage international funding. The paradox is therefore manifest: while Tunisia has historically been the best-funded Maghreb country, the viability of its LGBTQI+ organisations is now seriously threatened by a hostile political environment.

In Morocco, the increase in funding reflects growing recognition of associative dynamism, but organisations continue to face persistent criminalisation and heavy administrative constraints. In Algeria, financial marginalisation is reinforced by a repressive political context in which associative freedoms and LGBTQI+ rights are subject to severe restrictions, limiting international funding opportunities almost entirely.

Ultimately, the trajectory observed highlights a dual vulnerability: on the one hand, a structural dependence on a limited number of funding windows that exposes the Maghreb to strong fluctuations from one cycle to the next; on the other, increasingly restrictive national contexts that compromise organisations' capacity to benefit even from available resources.



4. Typology of Active Donors in the Maghreb

LGBTQI+ funding in the MENA region, and more specifically in the Maghreb, rests on an extremely concentrated ecosystem, structured around a limited number of bilateral donors, international private foundations, regional feminist funds, intermediary regranting organisations, and a few multilateral mechanisms. Cross-analysis of the *Global Resources Report (GPP)* and the AWID 2025 corpus, including the full *Where Is the Money for Feminist Movements?* report and the *WITM Data Snapshots* reveals an ecosystem characterised by structural dependence on a small number of Western actors, thematic fragmentation of funding, high administrative requirements, and deep vulnerability to global budgetary contraction dynamics. In this context, LGBTQI+ organisations in the Maghreb, already underfunded and operating in restrictive political environments, are among the most exposed and least supported.

Bilateral donors have historically occupied a central place in LGBTQI+ funding in the region. The Netherlands long served as one of the major donors, notably through multi-year programmes such as Power of Pride, implemented by COC Nederland, ILGA World, and several regional organisations. Sweden, through Sida, supported initiatives in human rights, gender equality, and the rule of law, playing a key role in structuring feminist and LGBTQI+ funding. Canada, with the 2SLGBTQI+ International Assistance Program, has become an emerging donor in the global LGBTQI+ rights field . However, since 2024, these funding streams have undergone major contraction. The Netherlands has cut more than 70% of its funding for civil society organisations and eliminated dedicated budget lines for women's rights and gender equality; Sweden has reduced its ODA by approximately 3 billion SEK; and the United States has proceeded with the dissolution of USAID, ending 86% of its programmes in human rights, governance, civil society, and SRHR. AWID notes that this global defunding dynamic, exacerbated by the redirection of resources towards geopolitical priorities, disproportionately affects feminist and LGBTQI+ organisations in the Global South, including those in the Maghreb, which are almost entirely dependent on external funding[29].

28. Égides, GPP, Dignity Network Canada, Standing Up: Canada's Leadership in Global LGBTI Funding (2024). https://www.egides.org/sites/www.egides.org/files/2024-fichiersite/Canada-Report_ver5_singlepage.pdf
29. AWID, Where is the Money? An Evidence-Driven Call to Resource Feminist Organizing (2025). https://www.awid.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/AWID_WITM_REPORT_28_10_2025.pdf

International private foundations constitute a major pillar of global LGBTQI+ funding, notably Open Society Foundations (OSF), Foundation for a Just Society (FJS), and Arcus Foundation, which operate as private philanthropic foundations supporting human rights and social justice initiatives worldwide. Alongside these actors, international feminist funds occupy a determining role in financing feminist, trans, lesbian, and intersex movements. The most significant include Mama Cash, the world's first independent feminist fund, and the Astraea Lesbian Foundation for Justice. Additional actors include MADRE, a transnational feminist organisation, as well as funds such as the African Women's Development Fund (AWDF), FRIDA The Young Feminist Fund, Doria Feminist Fund, International Trans Fund, ONSIDE Fund, and the Fonds pour les Femmes en Méditerranée (FFMed).

Unlike traditional private foundations, these funds function as public foundations or women's funds, collecting resources from multiple donors, including foundations, governments, and individuals, and redistributing them as accessible grants. Several of these funds do not require legal registration, a crucial criterion for LGBTQI+ organisations operating in the repressive environments of the Maghreb, where registering an explicitly SOGIESC-focused structure remains impossible.

In parallel, funds dedicated to human rights play an essential role in the region. Among them, the Fund for Global Human Rights (FGHR) is distinguished by its capacity to provide flexible, structural support adapted to informal organisations or those facing high security risks. FGHR thus occupies a strategic position in the Maghreb, particularly regarding protection, digital security, documentation, and capacity-building. However, AWID notes that only a few funds offer long-term structural funding, which limits the stability and resilience of LGBTQI+ organisations operating in high-risk contexts. Global South feminist funds play a particularly essential role, albeit while remaining underfunded. Leading from the South (LFS), funded by the Netherlands and implemented by a consortium of Global South feminist funds (AWDF, Women's Fund Asia, Fondo de Mujeres del Sur), remains one of the rare mechanisms allowing explicit access for feminist and queer organisations in North Africa[30]. The Fonds pour les Femmes en Méditerranée (FFMed) constitutes a key regional actor, particularly for feminist organisations operating in politically sensitive contexts. The Doria Feminist Fund, based in Lebanon, plays a growing role as a regional feminist donor for young queer feminist movements. However, AWID notes that these funds, already undercapitalised, are now absorbing growing pressure from the reduction of bilateral funding, which accentuates the fragility of their operational reach.

30. Leading from the South. https://www.leadingfromthesouth.org/about-us/?utm_.com

Intermediary organisations responsible for regranting constitute an essential element of the ecosystem, since the majority of LGBTQI+ organisations in the Maghreb cannot access international donors directly. The main intermediaries include COC Nederland, Outright International, HIVOS, CHOICE for Youth & Sexuality, and Rutgers. This model allows unregistered, informal, or politically restricted organisations to be reached, but creates a structural dependence: when bilateral donors reduce their funding, intermediaries lose their redistribution capacity. The suspension by Outright International of more than 120 LGBTQI+ sub-grants due to US cuts illustrates this fragility[31]. AWID notes that Maghreb organisations are particularly dependent on these intermediaries, as they do not meet the administrative criteria required by global donors, notably regarding legal registration and documentary compliance.

Multilateral donors, notably UNFPA, UNAIDS, UN Women, and UNDP, provide complementary support in the areas of HIV, SRHR, discrimination, and the protection of human rights defenders. The Global Equality Fund (GEF), led by the US State Department and its international partners, has long constituted an essential source of support for the protection of LGBTQI+ defenders. However, US restructuring undermines this mechanism[32] and reduces support opportunities for organisations situated in the repressive contexts of the Maghreb.

AWID data provide a decisive lens on the real conditions of access to feminist and LGBTQI+ funding. The report Les *Where Is the Money? Data Snapshots* (2025), based on responses from 1,174 organisations in 128 countries, reveals an ecosystem marked by persistent structural barriers. While 71% of organisations receive some form of external funding, 86% consider that few resources genuinely exist for their movements, themes or regions, and 65% report not meeting the legal or administrative criteria required by donors, particularly in repressive contexts across the Global South[33]. In budgetary terms, 58% of organisations operate with less than 30,000 USD per year, including 17% with less than 5,000 USD and 14% with no budget at all, while the global annual median caps at 22,000 USD, with no significant progress in more than a decade. Trans, intersex, and queer organisations, often unregistered and local, are structurally situated below this median. Faced with these constraints, self-financing becomes a necessity rather than a choice: 81% of organisations resort to autonomous resources (volunteering, community solidarity, in-kind contributions), and 29% report these mechanisms as their primary source of financial survival. Finally, the temporal dimension of funding exacerbates precarity: 72% of organisations receive grants with an average duration of 18 months or less, and only 4% have access to funding of more than three years, making strategic planning, institutional consolidation, or durable activist protection extremely difficult in contexts like the Maghreb.

31. OutRight International, Defunding Freedom 2.0 (2025)
https://outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/Defunding%20Freedom_Impacts_US_Foreign_Aid_Cuts_on_LGBTIQ_People_Worldwide_2.pdf?.com
32. Ibid
33. AWID, WITM Data Snapshots 2025
https://www.awid.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/WITM_DATA_SNAPSHOTS_EN.pdf?utm_.com

Finally, AWID documents significant thematic imbalances: trans movements receive less than 1% of global feminist and LGBTQI+ funding; LBQ+ groups remain invisible; intersex organisations, while benefiting from a relatively high number of donors, receive only minimal amounts; and sex worker movements remain marginalised[34]. For the Maghreb, where these movements operate in particularly hostile environments, this asymmetry drastically limits their capacity for organisation, advocacy, and institutional survival.

In this context, Francophone actors play a relatively marginal but strategic role. Égides constitutes one of the rare Francophone initiatives providing support in mental health, organisational strengthening, and advocacy in Francophone countries, including North Africa. However, the Francophone world remains severely underfunded: according to the GPP, only approximately %1 of global LGBTQI+ funding targets Francophone contexts, which further accentuates the marginalisation of Maghreb organisations.

34. Ibid

Ultimately, the typology of active donors in the region reveals a profoundly fragile system: extreme concentration of funding sources, thematic fragmentation that prevents the addressing of multidimensional needs, structural dependence on intermediaries that are themselves vulnerable, and a rapid contraction of funding linked to bilateral donor policies. LGBTQI+ organisations in the Maghreb, particularly trans, LBQ+, intersex and sex worker organisations, find themselves at the intersection of several levels of marginalisation: political, geographical, linguistic and financial. AWID data explicitly call for multi-year, flexible, and contextualised funding as an indispensable condition for the survival of LGBTQI+ movements in the region.

IV. Political, Security, and Anti-Rights Dynamics in the Maghreb

Political, Security, and Anti-Rights Dynamics in the Maghreb

1. Accelerated Shrinking of Civic Space

Since 2019, **the Maghreb has experienced a systemic contraction of civic space, characterised by the reassertion of state control over society, the use of ambiguous legal frameworks to criminalise dissent, and the rise of anti-rights campaigns supported by state, religious, and media actors.** A shared authoritarian dynamic traverses the region: criminalisation of individual freedoms, instrumentalisation of public morality, sophisticated digital surveillance, repression of independent NGOs, and control of foreign funding.

LGBTQI+ people have become privileged targets, not only because of the identities they embody, but because they represent an autonomous and unassimilated segment of civil society.

Existing legal frameworks, often inherited from colonial periods or consolidated during the 1960s-1980s, are mobilised to arbitrarily justify arrests, prosecutions, bans on associations, and restrictions on the circulation of funding.

2. Morocco: Diffuse Repression, Judicialisation of Dissent and Instrumentalisation of Morality

Morocco maintains an explicitly criminalising legal framework with respect to LGBTQI+ people. Article 489 of the Penal Code punishes same-sex relations with imprisonment of between six months and three years. Additional provisions regarding "public indecency" (art. 483), "violation of public morality" (art. 484), and "sexual relations outside of marriage" (art. 490) are frequently used to circumvent the absence of direct evidence in criminal cases involving LGBTQI+ people[35].

A restrictive body of case law further constrains civic space on freedom of association. Authorities may refuse the registration of any structure deemed contrary to "public order" under Law No. 75-00 on associations. In practice, no explicitly LGBTQI+ organisation has been able to register. On the security front, several international investigations have documented the use of spyware such as Pegasus and Predator against journalists, activists, academics, and human rights defenders[36]. This surveillance climate has direct implications for LGBTQI+ people through practices such as police blackmail, extortion during arrests, telephone confiscation, threats of exposure, and outing campaigns orchestrated on Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok.

These strategies amount to a political management of morality, in which the stigmatisation of civil society in general, and LGBTQI+ people in particular, serves as a resource for neutralising perceived opposition. Since 2019, several high-profile cases have illustrated the use of morality as a tool of repression against journalists, feminist activists, and students, embedding the LGBTQI+ question within a broader authoritarian architecture.

35. Lamyaâ Achary, "Who Gets to Speak for Us? Legitimacy of Queer Activism in Morocco," Development in Practice, published online 9 February 2026, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2026.2622915

36. Amnesty International, Forensic Methodology Report: How to Catch NSO Group's Pegasus (2021). https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/doc10/4487/2021/en/

3. Algeria: Integrated Repressive Architecture and Total Criminalisation of Public Space

Algeria today represents the most repressive environment in Francophone North Africa for LGBTQI+ people and civil society in general. Since the dismantling of the Hirak movement (2019-2021), the state has established a juridical and police infrastructure centralised around Law 12-06, which imposes a prior authorisation regime for the creation of associations. This law allows authorities to refuse registration on vague grounds related to "national unity", "public order", or "social values"[37].

In criminal law, multiple provisions of the Penal Code are regularly used to target activists, journalists, and LGBTQI+ people, including art. 333 (public indecency); art. 338 (criminalisation of homosexuality); art. 96 (receipt of foreign funds capable of "undermining state security"); and art. 87 bis (an expanded and politicised definition of terrorism). The CIHRS report, A Web of Intimidation (2024), describes this strategy as an "integrated architecture of repression", combining judicial harassment, digital surveillance, police control, and administrative pressure[38]. This architecture aims to neutralise all forms of independent mobilisation, whether political, social, or identity-based.

In this context, LGBTQI+ groups operate in total clandestinity, subject to heightened digital surveillance, arbitrary questioning, and a permanent risk of arrest. As a former member of an Algerian LGBTQI+ collective summarises:

> " Civil society today is completely suffocated; every space for expression has been closed, and even speaking to researchers or donors has become dangerous. "

This atmosphere of systemic repression makes any structuring of the movement impossible, forcing activists to adopt informal, fragmented strategies, often conducted from abroad.

For LGBTQI+ people, and particularly trans people, repression takes direct form through arbitrary arrests based on appearance; verbal, physical, and sexual violence in detention; confiscation of phones; and prosecutions based on "violations of public morality" or "usurpation of social role".

The total absence of legal recognition, the impossibility of registering an association, and the criminalisation of foreign funding make any formal structuring impossible. The Algerian LGBTQI+ civil society, therefore, operates exclusively in clandestinity, under constant threat.

37. Law No. 12-06 on Associations in Algeria, Official Journal of Algeria (2012). https://www.joradp.dz/ftp/jo-francais/2012/f2012002.pdf
38. CIHRS, 'The noose is tightening around us': Algeria's use of transnational repression to crack down on dissent (2024). https://cihrs.org/a-web-of-intimidation-new-report-reveals-algerian-governments-global-crackdown-on-dissent/?lang=en

4. Tunisia: Collapse of the Rule of Law and Authoritarian Instrumentalisation of Morality

Since the concentration of powers in the hands of President Kaïs Saïed in 2021, Tunisia has experienced an authoritarian turn marked by the weakening of the judiciary, restriction of civic space, and the heightened politicisation of public morality. Article 230 of the Penal Code, which punishes homosexual relations with three years' imprisonment, continues to be applied and is frequently accompanied by violations of procedural rights, notably forced anal examinations. Since 2022, LGBTQI+ organisations have reported an increase in proceedings initiated under Article 230 of the Penal Code, as well as other provisions relating to "public morals" or "public order". The practice of forced anal examinations, condemned by international bodies, continues to be employed by judicial authorities. As Amnesty International notes,

> " security forces continued to subject men and trans women to forced anal examinations as part of investigations related to Article 230, a practice amounting to torture "[39].

In 2023, at least 41 trials targeting homosexual or trans people were initiated across the country. Between 26 September and 2 October, 27 LGBTQI+ people were arrested in Tunis, Sousse, and Hammamet, signalling a particularly aggressive repressive campaign.

39. Amnesty International, Tunisia: Human Rights Report (2024). https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/tunisia/report-tunisia/

Tunisia's 2011 law on associations had opened considerable space for civil society. Still, since 2023, the government has sought to revise it to restrict foreign funding, increase administrative surveillance, and limit activities perceived as contrary to "national values"[40]. LGBTQI+ NGOs face raids, confiscation of equipment, defamation campaigns, and continuous administrative harassment. As one LGBTQI+ organisation leader interviewed explained:

> " They block our funding without giving any reason; every time we ask for a response, no one answers. It is not only against us, the entire civil society is being targeted. "

Economic deterioration, xenophobic tensions, and nationalist rhetoric have created an environment in which LGBTQI+ people are assimilated into agents of destabilisation. Trans people are particularly targeted through arbitrary arrests for "non-conforming appearance", police violence, blackmail, cyber-harassment, and denial of healthcare or housing.

Tunisia has thus shifted from fragile pluralism to an assumed authoritarianism, in which morality and security converge to justify tight control of civil society and targeted repression.

40. HRW, Tunisia: Draft Law to Dismantle Civil Society Must Be Rejected (2023). https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2023/11/07/tunisie-il-faut-rejeter-le-projet-de-loi-visant-demanteler-la-societe-civile

V

Regional Dynamics of LGBTQI+ Funding in North Africa

Regional Dynamics of LGBTQI+ Funding in North Africa

Note: All quotations used in this section are anonymised to ensure the security of the individuals and organisations interviewed.

Data collected through interviews with donors and international organisations active in the region reveal a landscape marked by a profound asymmetry:

North Africa is simultaneously highly visible in international human rights discourse, while being practically absent from LGBTQI+ financial flows.

Donors intervene in a fragmented, cautious manner, or only when diplomatic intermediation exists.

This tension between political interest, security constraints, and administrative logics produces a funding environment in which local groups must structure themselves amid chronic scarcity and permanent uncertainty.

1. A Hyper-Politicised but Structurally Underfunded Region

Interviews with donors confirm that Francophone North Africa remains a marginal zone within the global cartography of LGBTQI+ funding, despite an extremely high level of risk for communities. The director of a feminist fund states:

> " The truth is we don't know who funds. There are very few funds or organisations that fund with strong knowledge of the terrain. "

This statement encapsulates one of the central findings of this study: the region is subject to discourse about "complexity", "dangerousness," or opacity, but rarely to sustained, structured engagement. The Executive Director of Donor I adds a key point: North Africa is funded without ever being named as such. **LGBTQI+ funding is rendered invisible within "gender", "violence," and "women's" funding streams, because donors cannot publicly assume explicit support for LGBTQI+ groups in countries where the very existence of a trans or queer collective is criminalised.** This forced invisibilisation produces a double effect: groups exist politically, but not administratively; donors fund, but cannot make their support visible.

From the perspective of feminist and queer funds, North Africa appears as a "frontier space": a zone that is simultaneously prioritised in narratives, rising anti-rights offensives, systemic violence, criminalisation, and secondary in the actual allocation of resources. Donor H describes a "huge gap" between countries, noting that "Morocco is a bit more supported. But Algeria and Tunisia, very little." Donor F quantifies its annual envelope for North Africa at approximately 80,000 to 90,000 USD, covering Morocco and Tunisia primarily, with no active partnership in Algeria. Donor G describes an even more fragmented presence: a few past grants in Algeria and Tunisia, and a first group supported in Morocco only in 2023, with a grant of 10,000 euros.

This limited presence is not merely a matter of budgetary volume, but of political structuring. Several funds emphasise that the region is "forgotten" even within spaces that claim to be Francophone. As the Executive Director of an African feminist fund notes:

> "These are regions we don't think about. Even when we say Francophone, we rarely think of North Africa."

Francophonie thus functions as an empty signifier: it does not automatically open funding spaces, and sometimes contributes instead to rendering invisible the political, linguistic, and cultural specificities of the Maghreb, amalgamated into broader or more "legible" groupings for donors.

At the intra-regional level, interviews confirm an implicit hierarchy. Morocco concentrates a significant share of the few available funds. Tunisia benefits from occasional support, often intermittent or indirect. Algeria remains at the margins, supported only through punctual mechanisms. The result is an unequal geography of funding: one country slightly over-visible (Morocco), one country considered a "democratic laboratory" but poorly supported (Tunisia), and one country nearly abandoned to its security risks (Algeria).

Finally, the nature of funding confirms this structural fragility. Amounts remain modest and fragmented. Donor F allocates between 10,000 and 25,000 USD per grant; Donor L supports groups in Morocco at between 10,000 and 20,000 euros; Donor G funded its first Moroccan group at 10,000 euros; Donor M maintains programmes limited to Morocco between 47,000 and 77,000 USD. To these are added more substantial but highly targeted funding streams, such as the 200,000 USD allocated by Donor K in Morocco in 2024, distributed across ten LGBTQI+ groups, of which three are trans-led organisations. These amounts, situated within the global context of international philanthropy, confirm that Francophone North Africa remains a marginal segment of an already globally underfunded field.

2. The Administrative Burden as a Mechanism of Sorting and Control

Interviews reveal that the question is not only about "how much" funding reaches the region, but how it arrives, under what conditions, and at what administrative cost. Across the three countries studied, administrative, linguistic, and accounting requirements play the role of an indirect filter, producing an implicit selection between "administratively competent" groups and more informal community-based groups, often trans-led, young, or unregistered[41].

Donor K illustrates this tension well. The SHRR programme, integrated within Love Alliance, funds ten LGBTQI+ groups in Morocco, with core grants of 20,000 USD and project grants of up to 50,000 USD. This support is significant, particularly as it targets unregistered groups through innovative arrangements based on personal accounts, dual internal commitment, and shared accountability within collectives. However, this model is framed by quarterly reporting, exclusively in English, with an obligation to justify at least 70% of expenditures and to provide both an interim and final narrative report. The linguistic and technical burden is considerable for collectives whose core work is community-based, not bureaucratic.

Donor L openly acknowledges having contributed to complicating reporting. The North Africa programme, endowed with approximately 100,000 euros per year distributed among five Moroccan partners, requires structured narrative and financial reports, sometimes highly detailed. A team member admits:

> "We made reporting more complicated without meaning to."

This statement carries political significance: it signals a degree of donor awareness, but also the inertia of management systems that remain calibrated on Northern administrative norms, poorly compatible with the reality of informal groups or those operating under police pressure.

41. Lamyaâ Achary, "Who Gets to Speak for Us? Legitimacy of Queer Activism in Morocco," Development in Practice, published online 9 February 2026, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2026.2622915

The Algerian case is even more revealing. Certain donors encounter administrative requirements, particularly in terms of documentary traceability, that in the Algerian context are not only impractical but dangerous for their partners. Adaptations exist, but they remain contingent on the political will of each donor, in the absence of institutional frameworks that recognise the specificity of repressive contexts. One interviewee summarises this tension: "Just because it's complicated doesn't mean we should stop funding. We have to take the risks upon ourselves to protect the groups." This posture reveals that adaptation is possible, but that it rests on individual arbitrations where it should instead derive from institutional policies, themselves often constrained by rules imposed by donors' own donors.

Donor M illustrates another form of filtering. LGBTQI+ groups are funded in Morocco only if they have a legally registered "fiscal host". In the absence of one, Donor M proposes a third-party partner to host the funds. This registration or legal sponsorship requirement de facto excludes a large proportion of informal collectives, notably trans, queer, or young organisations, that cannot or do not wish to depend on more institutional structures in a context of criminalisation. Added to this is the obligation to produce an audit, including for unregistered groups, which creates a "double constraint": to receive funds, one must comply with standards that are impossible to meet without prior resources.

Donor N highlights another dimension of the administrative burden: the absence of an integrated language policy. The majority of documents, reports, and accounting tools are produced in English or French, while the region is predominantly Arabic-speaking. In practice, translation depends on the goodwill of individual staff members, making the process arbitrary and exclusionary. Partners may submit reports in their own language, but no official structure is yet in place to institutionalise this flexibility. This informality of flexibility creates a paradox: donors claim to be open, but this openness rests on individuals, not policies.

In contrast, some feminist funds attempt to loosen these constraints. Donor G reduces reporting to a two-page narrative and a simplified financial table, with no receipts required, while taking on the burden of explanation vis-à-vis its own donors: "We absorb the administrative weight. It is our role to explain to donors." Donor F requests a flexible annual report, accepts several languages (French, Arabic, Spanish, Russian), and acknowledges that multilingualism still needs to be systematised. Donor H has opted for calls for proposals translated into Arabic and French, accompanied by multilingual webinars, specifically to reach groups less familiar with Anglophone standards. Donor I adds an even deeper degree of flexibility: oral reports, simplified audits, receipt of voice messages via WhatsApp when security requires, and the capacity to transfer funds discreetly when it is impossible to use standard channels.

Taken together, these practices map a fine cartography of bureaucratic power: in the region, access to funding depends as much on the capacity to survive repression as on the capacity to produce reports, audits, and forms in the languages and formats expected by donors. The administrative burden thus functions as a sorting device, often invisible, that hierarchises movements according to their linguistic, academic, or technocratic capital, reinforcing internal inequalities and excluding the most precarious collectives, notably trans-led and informal ones.

3. Reconfiguration of Funding

Interviews reveal that the LGBTQI+ funding ecosystem in Francophone North Africa is evolving within a context of global crisis. Since 2020, the massive budget cuts by the Netherlands, Sweden, and then the United States, combined with the rise of conservative governments in Europe, have profoundly affected the feminist and LGBTQI+ funds that were already operating at reduced capacity in the region. This structural contraction of resources creates a domino effect: fewer funds available, more competition among donors, and increased fragility for local groups that depend almost entirely on international funding.

An interview with an LGBTQI+ organisation in Tunisia adds a crucial dimension, often absent from philanthropic discourse. The direct impact of political positioning on access to funding is documented in striking terms. The organisation's leader explains that their organisation lost German funding after the ambassador reported personal publications in support of Gaza to the donor.

> " We lost more than 50,000 euros from the German donor in one go [...] because of my pro-Palestine publications. "

This experience confirms a growing phenomenon. **Certain European and American donors, German donors in particular, impose strict political red lines and sometimes demand a public neutrality incompatible with the reality of feminist and queer movements in the region.** Globalised geopolitics thus becomes an implicit condition of funding eligibility, excluding organisations that refuse to silence their solidarity.

Donor L reports that its resources have decreased by approximately 60%, directly affecting its support programmes for Moroccan organisations. Several partnerships, despite being well-established, have not been renewed due to insufficient budget. Donor G confirms a similar trend: the organisation is "no longer able to allocate tens of millions as before", which reduces its capacity to fund historically marginalised regions, including North Africa. Donor F describes a 25% drop in its overall budget, accompanied by staff cuts, suspension of research projects, and a strategic repositioning towards regions where partnerships are already consolidated.

From the perspective of regional feminist funds, Donor I offers an important perspective. Even though the fund is not directly dependent on Western governments, it feels the effects of the crisis because its partners, particularly in Lebanon and Turkey, are seeing their funding collapse, generating increased demand for emergency support. The Executive Director notes that "the LGBTQI+ community is the first to be attacked" when public donors cut their budgets, and that this financial vulnerability compounds the state repression already present.

Donor N, which is beginning its engagement in the region, confirms that European financial flows are becoming more uncertain. Projects involving public donors (AFD, EU) depend on unstable political cycles, complicating planning and limiting the possibility of multi-year partnerships. The MENA lead notes that funding earmarked for North Africa "is not guaranteed" and will need to be reassessed in the coming years, depending on budgetary decisions. Donor J notes that local feminist funds are on the front line facing budget cuts and must balance political commitments with financial survival. The crisis profoundly affects their capacity to support trans and queer groups in the Maghreb in a coherent manner, many of whom have no other source of funding.

Faced with this structural crisis, several donors are adopting survival strategies. Donor I strengthens intra-feminist solidarity, prioritising groups at risk of disappearing without support. Donor F explores alternative economic models, seeking to diversify its revenue sources towards private foundations, as well as to turn to mixed financing to preserve its capacity for action in the region. Donor H insists on the need for a collective approach among donors to avoid duplication and to pool risks in repressive contexts.

These adjustments show that the region is evolving within an ecosystem where the logics of funding depend less on the local situation than on global dynamics.

LGBTQI+ philanthropy in North Africa now operates in a more precarious environment, in which any international budgetary reallocation can wipe out years of community work.

Donors that remain active, primarily feminist funds, thus become indispensable political actors, often operating at the margins of standard institutional norms to maintain a minimum level of access to resources.

4. Gatekeeping, Francophone Hierarchies and the Structural Production of Invisibility

The dynamics of gatekeeping (access control) observed in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia cannot be understood independently of the transnational structures of funding, nor of the way in which Francophonie organises access to information, networks, and legitimacy. Interviews reveal that the fragmentation of movements is not primarily produced by internal tensions, but by a funding system that concentrates resources, filters organisations according to their linguistic and administrative capacity, and imposes political frameworks aligned with Northern priorities.

The report Regional Analysis of LGBTQI+ Organizing in Southwest Asia and North Africa highlights that the centralisation of resources within a handful of "visible" organisations creates an intermediary power that structures the entire LGBTQI+ ecosystem in certain countries, particularly in Algeria[42]. This monopolisation restricts the access of emerging collectives to information, donors, and regional spaces, while reinforcing an informal hierarchy based not on community rootedness, but on international recognition. Added to this are linguistic obstacles: resources circulate predominantly in English or standard Arabic, while movements operate in Darija, French, Amazigh, or hybrid registers. This tension produces a paradoxical Francophonie: omnipresent in the daily practices of organisations, but largely absent from the decision-making circuits dominated by English.

Interviews conducted in Morocco confirm these dynamics. Donor L acknowledges that its selection mechanisms, by privileging organisations capable of producing narrative and financial reports in English, have sometimes reinforced already existing asymmetries. The programme mechanically produces a form of institutional conservation: already professionalised organisations remain within the ecosystem, while trans, queer or informal groups, often among the most vulnerable, remain at the margins due to a lack of the linguistic and administrative tools required.

Feminist funds allow a deeper analysis. Donor I insists that gatekeeping is less the product of local rivalries than of legitimacy criteria defined from the outside. The Executive Director describes a system in which the capacity to "perform" administrative conformity, often in English or technocratic French, determines access to funds more than actual community work.

42. Lamyaâ Achary & Nora Noralla, *Regional Analysis of LGBTQI+ Organizing in Southwest Asia and North Africa*, Astraea Lesbian Foundation for Justice, septembre 2024.
https://www.academia.edu/145124553/Regional_Analysis_of_LGBTQI_Organizing_in_Southwest_Asia_and_North_Africa?source=swp_share

Another donor adds that Francophonie itself becomes a space of tension: used locally as a language of organisation, international donors sideline Francophone organisations in favour of English ones, which forces organisations to adapt to linguistic registers that reflect neither their practices nor their political priorities. Within this architecture, non-institutionalised Francophone organisations, notably trans or Amazighophone collectives, find themselves structurally invisibilised.

The Astraea report also shows that fragmentation is fed by exclusive relational practices[43].In several countries, a limited number of established individuals or organisations become the privileged interlocutors of donors, locking out access for new collectives. This conditional visibility creates an economy of recognition in which those with prior networks, often built through international Francophone or Anglophone training programmes, access opportunities. At the same time, recent movements remain on the periphery of the philanthropic field. The language barrier plays a determining role: mastering English opens donors' doors; being limited to French or Darija closes them.

Interviews in Tunisia reveal another form of gatekeeping, this time explicitly geopolitical. The immediate suspension of funds demonstrates how certain donors now condition access to funding on implicit ideological alignment.

> " We are criminalised by our own government, and now penalised by European donors for our political positions "

states one Tunisian activist. Philanthropy thus becomes a space in which political conformity, notably on questions related to Palestine, acts as an additional filter, reinforcing the exclusion of organisations that articulate anti-colonial or Western power-critical positions.

43. Ibid

The Moroccan case illustrates forms of gatekeeping that go beyond administrative or legal requirements. The interview presented here, concerning a trans-led collective rooted in an Amazigh context, illuminates a specific configuration that cannot be generalised to all organisations in the country, but that reveals structural filtering mechanisms. In this case, community work is conducted primarily in Amazigh. Arabic already constitutes a linguistic burden, while English and French, required in relations with donors, represent a major barrier to funding access.

> " We work first in Amazigh. Even Arabic is already an effort for us, and English or French is almost impossible. "

These experiences reflect broader patterns documented among Moroccan LGBTQI+ communities, where the majority of individuals remain disconnected from formal advocacy structures, and where linguistic and class hierarchies within the movement itself determine whose needs are centred or marginalised within community spaces[44]. **This linguistic hierarchy compounds a thematic gatekeeping that reduces trans organisations to narrow frameworks, primarily linked to HIV, at the expense of their political, organisational, and security needs.**

> " As a trans organisation, we are often brought back to the HIV question, even though our needs go far beyond that. "

As with other collectives in Morocco, the impossibility of legal registration imposes informal functioning, which itself becomes an implicit criterion of exclusion within funding mechanisms.

> " We cannot register legally. Everything goes through trusted individuals. "

This case demonstrates how, even within a relatively diversified national context, the linguistic and thematic frameworks of international funding produce differentiated forms of marginalisation, reinforcing the invisibility of groups already situated at the margins.

Finally, certain donors highlight one last layer of gatekeeping: the performativity of vulnerability. Several donors expect, often without stating it explicitly, that organisations demonstrate a dramatic level of risk or oppression to justify their support. This dynamic favours organisations capable of documenting these risks in institutional language, at the expense of collectives whose vulnerability is real but difficult to "narrativise" in the required formats. This process further reinforces linguistic and administrative hierarchies, at precisely the moment when violence and attacks against LGBTQI+ people are increasing in the region, and funding is declining.

The dynamics of gatekeeping within North African LGBTQI+ movements are thus the product of a superposition of mechanisms: administrative criteria (language, reporting, compliance), linguistic structures inherited from Francophonie, geopolitical filters linked to Western donor priorities, exclusive relational mechanisms, and an expected performativity of vulnerability.

Feminist funds attempt to reverse these dynamics by funding the margins, working multilingually, prioritising administrative flexibility, and refusing structural competition. But their capacity to transform the system remains limited as long as institutional donors perpetuate centralised, Anglophone, and politically conditioned funding models.

IV Recommendations



1. Recommendations to International and Bilateral Donors

1. Reinvest in Core and Multi-Year Funding

Donors must prioritise core, flexible, and multi-year funding (minimum 2-3 years) for LGBTQI+ organisations in North Africa. The data clearly demonstrate that short, hyper-thematic grants exacerbate precarity, fragmentation, and dependence on intermediaries, without reinforcing institutional resilience.

2. Decouple Financial Eligibility from Legal Registration

In contexts where the registration of LGBTQI+ organisations is impossible or dangerous, the requirement for legal status constitutes a mechanism of structural exclusion. Donors must explicitly recognise the legitimacy of informal collectives and accept alternative accountability modalities, without conditioning access to funds on an imposed "fiscal host".

3. Reform Administrative and Linguistic Requirements

Reporting, audit, and documentation requirements must be proportionate to the amounts allocated and to security contexts. English can no longer be treated as the default language. Donors must institutionalise multilingualism (French, Arabic, Darija, Amazigh) and fund translation as an eligible cost, not as an invisible burden on organisations.

4. Refuse Implicit Geopolitical Conditionalities

Donors must clarify and strictly limit informal political conditionalities. Subordinating access to funding to requirements of political neutrality compromises the ethical credibility of LGBTQI+ philanthropy and excludes organisations whose local rootedness is inseparable from broader political solidarity.

2. Recommendations to Feminist, Queer, and Francophone Funds

1. Strengthen Dedicated Francophone Mechanisms

Francophonie cannot remain a blind spot of LGBTQI+ philanthropy. Francophone donors and feminist funds must invest in mechanisms specifically designed for Francophone contexts, in North Africa but also in other marginalised regions, in order to reduce dependence on Anglophone intermediaries.

2. Fund the Margins, Not Only 'Visible Organisations'

Funds must continue to prioritise trans, LBQ+, intersex, sex worker, and Amazighophone collectives, even when they do not conform to dominant professionalisation standards. This implies accepting non-conventional reporting formats (oral, audio, visual) and recognising the value of informal community work.

3. Pool Risks Among Donors

Faced with the global contraction of funding, greater coordination among feminist and queer funds is needed to avoid duplication of criteria, competition between organisations, and concentration of resources. Co-financing and risk-sharing mechanisms would help maintain a minimum level of stability for the most exposed groups.

3. Recommendations to Intermediaries and Regranting Organisations

1. Reduce the Effects of Relational Gatekeeping

Intermediary organisations must put in place proactive strategies to reach collectives not connected to existing international networks. This includes multilingual open calls, transparent selection processes, and targeted support for emerging groups.

2. Recognise and Support Existing Resilience Strategies

Circumvention practices developed by organisations must not be perceived as anomalies, but as rational responses to hostile environments. Donors and intermediaries must adapt their accountability frameworks to support these practices without penalising them, recognising that organisational survival in repressive contexts requires forms of organisation that standard models cannot accommodate.

4. Cross-Cutting Recommendations

1. Document and Fund Security as a Structural Priority

Security, digital, physical, legal, and psychosocial assistance must be integrated as a central and non-accessory budget line. In contexts of heightened surveillance and moral repression, the very survival of organisations depends on this recognition.

2. Integrate Withdrawal Effects into the Decisions of Still-Active Donors

In a context of progressive disengagement by many public and private donors, the choices made by still-active donors, particularly bilateral donors and regranting funds, have a disproportionately structuring effect on the survival of LGBTQI+ movements in underfunded regions. Taking into account these cumulative withdrawal effects is essential to avoid resource concentration, the silent disappearance of local organisations, and the lasting loss of collective capacities in contexts already marked by repression.

IV. Glossary

This glossary defines the key terms, acronyms, concepts, and nouns used in this report. Entries are organized thematically to facilitate reading and use of the document as a reference tool.

A. Institutional Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFD-Agence Française de Développement

(French Development Agency) French development institution implementing bilateral aid programs, particularly in North Africa.

AWDF-African Women's Development Fund

Pan-African feminist fund providing grants to women's rights organizations across the continent. One of the funds implementing the Leading from the South program and active within the broader LGBTQI+ funding ecosystem.

AWID-Association for Women's Rights in Development

International feminist organization producing research on feminist and LGBTQI+ movement funding worldwide. Its Where Is the Money for Feminist Organizing? (WITM) reports and Data Snapshots constitute key primary data sources for this report.

CFLI: Canada Fund for Local Initiatives

A decentralized Canadian government funding mechanism supporting small-scale local projects in priority countries, including in North Africa.

CIHRS: Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

Human rights organization whose 2024 report A Web of Intimidation documents Algeria's use of transnational repression against civil society. Cited in section 4.3.

COC Nederland

Dutch LGBTQI+ advocacy organization that has served as a major intermediary for global LGBTQI+ regranting, notably through the Power of Pride program. Affected by the 2024 Dutch aid cuts.

FFMed: Mediterranean Women's Fund

Regional feminist fund focused on the Mediterranean, providing accessible grants to feminist organizations operating in politically sensitive contexts, including North Africa.

FGHR: Fund for Global Human Rights

International fund providing flexible and structural support to human rights organizations, with a capacity to reach informal organizations and groups operating under security risks.

FJS-Foundation for a Just Society

U.S.-based private foundation supporting gender equality, LGBTQI+ rights, and broader social justice initiatives globally.

FRIDA-The Young Feminist Fund

Feminist fund supporting young feminist activists and organizations worldwide. One of the funds cited in the typology of active donors.

GEF-Global Equality Fund

Multilateral fund led by the U.S. Department of State that has mobilized more than USD 100 million since 2011 to support LGBTQI+ organizations in over 100 countries. Its operational continuity was jeopardized by the dissolution of USAID.

GPP-Global Philanthropy Project

International initiative tracking government and philanthropic funding for LGBTQI+ communities worldwide through its biennial *Global Resources Report (GRR)*. Primary source of quantitative data for this report.

GRR-Global Resources Report

Biennial report produced by GPP documenting the volume and distribution of LGBTQI+ funding from governments and foundations worldwide. The 2021–2022 cycle provides the main data used in sections 3.2 and 3.3.

HIVOS-Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation

Dutch international development organization active in LGBTQI+ and civil society regranting. One of the intermediary organizations whose redistributive capacity was weakened by cuts to Dutch ODA.

ILGA World (International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association)

Global federation of LGBTQI+ organizations engaged in advocacy and regranting. One of the implementing partners of the Power of Pride program.

ITF: International Trans Fund

Trans-specific fund dedicated to supporting trans-led organizations worldwide. One of the funds cited in the typology of active donors, and part of the underfunded ecosystem serving trans movements.

LFS-Leading from the South

Feminist regranting program funded by the Netherlands and implemented by a consortium of Global South feminist funds (AWDF, Women's Fund Asia, Fondo de Mujeres del Sur). One of the few mechanisms explicitly accessible to feminist and queer organizations in North Africa. Affected by the 2024 Dutch aid cuts.

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

Geopolitical region including North African and West Asian countries, encompassing the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and Iran. Used in this report as the reference framework for GPP funding data.

ODA: Official Development Assistance

The total volume of concessional public funding provided by donor governments to support economic development and welfare in recipient countries. In this report, the term is primarily used in reference to Swedish and Dutch budget cuts.

OHCHR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

The United Nations body responsible for promoting and protecting human rights globally. Referenced in connection with the September 2025 findings of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Gaza.

OSF: Open Society Foundations

Major international private foundation that has provided occasional support to LGBTQI+ organizations worldwide, often through global programs not specifically designed with a regional or linguistic lens.

Sida: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

Sweden's international development cooperation agency. Historically a key bilateral donor for feminist and LGBTQI+ funding. Subject to major budget cuts since 2024.

SOGIESC: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression, and Sex Characteristics

Technical term used in human rights and funding frameworks to encompass the identities and characteristics relevant to LGBTQI+ communities. This term is used in this report to reference the impossibility of registering an organization explicitly working on SOGIESC in the Maghreb.

SRHR: Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

Policy and funding framework encompassing access to contraception, abortion, maternal health, and related rights. Frequently linked to LGBTQI+ funding streams and affected by the same donor budget cuts.

UNAIDS: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

Joint UN program on HIV/AIDS. A multilateral mechanism providing complementary funding in HIV health and rights sectors, including for LGBTQI+ communities in the Maghreb.

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

Multilateral UN agency providing complementary support in areas including human rights protection, governance, and LGBTQI+ inclusion.

UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund

UN agency working on sexual and reproductive health. One of the multilateral donors providing complementary support to civil society organizations in the region.

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

Principale agence gouvernementale américaine pour l'aide au développement international. The primary U.S. government agency for international development assistance. Its dissolution in 2025, through integration into the Department of State and cancellation of approximately 86% of its programs, represents the most significant shock to global LGBTQI+ funding documented in this report.

B. Key Analytical Terms and Concepts

Administrative Burden

The cumulative weight of reporting, auditing, documentation, compliance, and language requirements imposed by donors on recipient organizations. In this report, the administrative burden is analysed as a structural filtering mechanism disproportionately excluding informal, trans-led, unregistered, or Arabic-speaking organizations lacking the bureaucratic and linguistic capital expected by donors.

Anti-Rights Movements

Organized coalitions (including state, religious, media, and civil society actors) that challenge the legitimacy of LGBTQI+ rights, feminist agendas, and sexual and reproductive rights. Their influence on donor governments is identified in this report as a contributing factor to the global contraction of LGBTQI+ funding.

Geopolitical Conditionality

The implicit or explicit expectation that organizations adopt specific political positions (particularly regarding armed conflicts) as a condition for receiving or maintaining funding. This report documents cases where LGBTQI+ organizations in Tunisia lost European funding following public expressions of solidarity with Palestine, analysing this as an emerging form of political filtering within philanthropy.

(Shrinking) Civic Space

The systemic contraction of the conditions under which civil society can operate, including restrictions on freedom of assembly, association, and expression; surveillance and harassment of activists; and legal reforms limiting foreign funding or administrative activity. Documented in all three countries studied, with Algeria representing the most extreme case.

Core / Structural Funding

Unrestricted or minimally restricted, multi-year funding supporting an organization's general operations and strategic priorities, as opposed to project-based grants. This report identifies the near disappearance of core funding in francophone North Africa as a key driver of organizational precarity.

Decolonial (Approach)

Analytical and political framework situating research within the historical and ongoing dynamics of colonialism, challenging the reproduction of Northern epistemological, institutional, and financial hierarchies. This report adopts a feminist, intersectional, and decolonial approach throughout, shaping both its methodology and interpretation of funding inequalities.

Defunding

The deliberate reduction or withdrawal of financial support from organizations, programs, or sectors. Used in this report to characterize the structural dynamic affecting feminist and LGBTQI+ movements globally since 2024, largely driven by U.S., Dutch, and Swedish political decisions.

Domino Effect

The cascading impact of donor budget cuts on regranting intermediaries and, subsequently, local organizations. When bilateral donors reduce allocations, intermediary organizations lose redistributive capacity, which in turn destabilizes or eliminates funding for local groups unable to access international donors directly.

Fiscal Sponsor

A legally registered organization that receives and manages funds on behalf of an unregistered group, providing the formal accountability structure required by certain donors. In the Maghreb, the requirement for a fiscal sponsor effectively excludes large numbers of informal and unregistered collectives.

Forced Invisibility

The structural process through which LGBTQI+ groups in North Africa receive funding without being publicly identified as such, because donors cannot openly support LGBTQI+ organizations in contexts where such identities are criminalized. This report argues that this produces a double effect: groups exist politically but not administratively; donors fund them but cannot visibly acknowledge their support.

Frontier Space

A concept used in this report to describe how North Africa appears to feminist and queer funds: simultaneously prioritized in narratives (due to rising anti-rights repression, systemic violence, and criminalization) yet marginalized in actual resource allocation.

Gatekeeping

The set of administrative, relational, linguistic, geopolitical, and thematic mechanisms controlling access to funding, information, and legitimacy within the LGBTQI+ philanthropic ecosystem. This report recognizes gatekeeping not primarily as a product of local rivalries, but as a structural effect of funding systems concentrating resources and imposing Northern eligibility standards.

Informal Collective

An organized group operating without legal registration. In the Maghreb, informality is not a choice but a necessity. No explicitly LGBTQI+ organization has been able to legally register in any of the three countries studied. This report argues that donors must recognize informal collectives as legitimate recipients and accept alternative accountability mechanisms.

Intersectionality

An analytical framework developed by Black feminist scholars examining how overlapping systems of oppression, including race, class, gender, sexuality, disability, and colonial history, interact to shape specific vulnerabilities and experiences. This report applies intersectionality to understand the compounded marginalization of trans, LBQ+, Amazigh-speaking, and sex worker-led organizations within funding ecosystems.

Judicialization of Dissent

The use of judicial and legal mechanisms to criminalize political opposition and civil society activism. In the Moroccan context, this report documents the mobilization of provisions relating to public morality, decency, and association law to repress LGBTQI+ organizing within a broader authoritarian framework.

Multilingualism

The capacity of donors, intermediaries, and organizations to operate in multiple languages. This report documents the dominance of English as the de facto standard for reporting, auditing, and documentation requirements, and identifies the institutionalization of multilingualism (French, Arabic, Darija, Tamazight) as a key recommendation.

Performativity of Vulnerability

The implicit expectation from donors that organizations demonstrate a narratively legible level of risk or oppression in order to justify support. This report identifies this dynamic as an additional layer of gatekeeping that advantages organizations capable of institutionally documenting risk while excluding those whose vulnerability is real but difficult to format within required templates.

Regranting

The process by which intermediary organizations receive funds from large donors and redistribute them to smaller, often unregistered or informal organizations unable to directly access international donors. This is a central mechanism for reaching LGBTQI+ groups in the Maghreb, but also one that creates structural dependency: when bilateral donors cut funding to intermediaries, redistributive capacity collapses.

Repressive Architecture

A concept borrowed from CIHRS's A Web of Intimidation (2024), used in this report to describe Algeria's integrated system of repression combining judicial harassment, digital surveillance, police control, and administrative pressure to neutralize independent organizing.

Resilience

The ability of LGBTQI+ organizations operating in hostile legal and political environments to sustain activity through informal, fragmented, and adaptive strategies. This report frames resilience not as an inherent organizational trait, but as a political and pragmatic response to the absence of adequate legal, banking, and funding frameworks.

C. Legal and Regulatory Terms

Article 230 (Tunisia)

Article of the Tunisian Penal Code punishing same-sex relations with up to three years of imprisonment. It continues to be enforced and is frequently accompanied by violations of procedural rights, including forced anal examinations condemned by international human rights bodies.

Article 338 (Algeria)

Article of the Algerian Penal Code criminalizing homosexuality, used in conjunction with other provisions (Article 333 on offenses against public decency; Article 96 on the receipt of foreign funds; Article 87 bis on terrorism) to target LGBTQI+ individuals and civil society actors.

Article 489 (Morocco)

Article of the Moroccan Penal Code punishing same-sex relations with six months to three years of imprisonment. Used alongside provisions concerning public indecency (Article 483), offenses against morality (Article 484), and sexual relations outside marriage (Article 490).

Forced Anal Examination

Invasive medical examination used by judicial authorities in Tunisia to gather evidence in prosecutions under Article 230. Condemned by Amnesty International and other international human rights bodies as amounting to torture.

Law 12-06 (Algeria)

Algerian law regulating associations, imposing a prior authorization regime for the creation of civil society organizations. It allows authorities to deny registration on vague grounds related to national unity, public order, or social values. A central instrument of civic space control in Algeria.

Law 75-00 (Morocco)

Moroccan law governing associations, allowing authorities to refuse the registration of any structure deemed contrary to public order. In practice, no explicitly LGBTQI+ organization has been able to register under this framework.

Pegasus / Predator

Commercial spyware produced by NSO Group (Pegasus) and other companies (Predator), documented in international investigations as having been deployed against journalists, activists, academics, and human rights defenders in Morocco.

D. Organizations, funds and programs

Arcus Foundation

A U.S.-based private foundation supporting LGBTQI+ rights and conservation. One of the major international foundations providing occasional support to francophone contexts, though not through a specifically adapted regional or linguistic lens.

Astraea Lesbian Foundation for Justice

U.S. based international feminist fund supporting LGBTQI+ movements worldwide, with particular attention to underfunded and marginalized communities. Its Regional Analysis of LGBTQI+ Organizing in Southwest Asia and North Africa (2024, co-authored by Lamyaâ Achary and Nora Noralla) is cited in section 5.4.

Doria Feminist Fund

A Lebanon-based feminist fund playing an increasingly important role as a regional feminist donor for young queer feminist movements in the MENA region.

Égides

International francophone LGBTQI+ rights organization headquartered in Montreal. One of the few initiatives specifically designed to address the needs of francophone LGBTQI+ movements. Leads the Tiwiza project in North Africa and co-produced the 2023 francophone GPP report. Publisher of the present report.

EuroMed Rights

A regional human rights network active in the Euro-Mediterranean space, cited as an intermediary organization.

MADRE

A transnational feminist organization supporting women's human rights and community-based organizations, cited in the typology of active feminist funds in the region.

Mama Cash

A Dutch feminist fund. One of the leading global funders of feminist, lesbian, bisexual, trans, and intersex movements worldwide.

ONSIDE Fund

A feminist fund supporting LGBTQI+ movements, cited in the typology of donors.

Outright International

An international LGBTQI+ human rights organization that has served as a major regranting intermediary. The suspension of more than 120 LGBTQI+ subgrants by Outright International following U.S. funding cuts is documented in this report as an illustration of the fragility of the intermediary model.

Rutgers International

Dutch sexual and reproductive health organization that served as an intermediary redistributing Dutch ODA to civil society organizations worldwide.

Tiwiza

Project led by Égides and funded by Global Affairs Canada, aimed at supporting the resilience of LGBTQI+ movements in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. This is the main Canadian funding mechanism cited in this report.

E. Geographic and Political Terms

Amazigh / Amazigh-speaking

Relating to the Indigenous peoples of North Africa and their languages (Tamazight, Tashelhit, Tarifit, and others). This report documents the particular marginalization of Amazigh-speaking LGBTQI+ collectives within funding ecosystems, where even Arabic (not to mention French or English) constitutes a linguistic burden. The Moroccan case study presented in section 5.4 concerns a trans-led collective rooted in an Amazigh context.

Darija

The Maghrebi Arabic language spoken in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, with distinct national variants. Distinct from Modern Standard Arabic, Darija is generally not accepted as a reporting language by international donors, contributing to the linguistic exclusion of grassroots organizations in the three countries studied.

Francophonie

This refers to the geopolitical and cultural space of French-speaking countries and communities. In this report, "francophonie" is critically analysed as functioning as an empty signifier that does not automatically open funding spaces and sometimes contributes to the invisibilisation of North African specificities by subsuming them into broader groupings. The report also documents how French itself is increasingly sidelined in favour of English in international funding circuits, placing francophone organizations in a doubly disadvantaged linguistic position.

Hirak

The Algerian popular protest movement active primarily between 2019 and 2021. Its dismantling by the Algerian state inaugurated the current period of intensified repression documented in section 4.3, including the systematic use of Law 12-06 to repress independent civil society.

Global South / Global North

A geopolitical and economic categorization distinguishing low and middle-income countries (Global South) from high-income donor countries (Global North). This report uses this framework to analyse structural inequalities in the distribution of LGBTQI+ funding.

Maghreb

The western North African subregion, comprising Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia as understood in this report.

Transnational Repression

The extension of state repressive practices beyond national borders to target diaspora activists, journalists, and human rights defenders. Documented in relation to Algeria in the 2024 CIHRS report and referenced in the report's analysis of the constraints affecting Algerian LGBTQI+ civil society, much of which operates from abroad.

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Funding Under Constraint

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